

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Office of the Director

April 24, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR : Major General Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

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SUBJECT : Comparative Data on Communist Aid to North Vietnam
and the Khmer Communists, and U.S. Aid to
South Vietnam

1. The attached statistics and comments on Communist and U.S. aid levels in Indochina have been prepared at the request of the Secretary of State. In a telephone conversation with Mr. Colby early last evening, Dr. Kissinger asked that that this data be delivered to him at the White House Situation Room at 0700 today, Wednesday, April 24.

2. While the overall classification of this memorandum is SECRET ☐, the data appearing in the table on Communist aid (paragraph 1) may be regarded as unclassified if the specific numbers are rounded and given as approximations.

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NSA REVIEWS
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Comparative Data on Communist Aid to North Vietnam and the Khmer Communists, and US Aid to South Vietnam

I. Communist Aid to North Vietnam

1. The Central Intelligence Agency's best estimates of military and economic aid to North Vietnam from the USSR, China and other Communist countries are:*

(millions of dollars)				
Calendar Year	From USSR	From China	From Eastern Europe and Other	TOTAL
1970				
military aid	90	100	Negl	190
economic aid	345	60	205	610
TOTAL	435	160	205	800
1971				
military aid	165	115	5	285
economic aid	320	105	195	620
TOTAL	485	220	200	905
1972				
military aid	375	230	5	610
economic aid	210	90	75	375
TOTAL	585	320	80	985
1973				
military aid	175	115	5	295
economic aid	200	225	85	510
TOTAL	375	340	90	805

*These figures include adjustments for price changes of +3 percent in 1971 over 1970, +3 percent in 1972 over 1971, and +8 percent in 1973 over 1972 in military goods and machinery.

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2. The military aid figures in the table above are our best estimates of the costs (in current prices) of comparable US military equipment. The economic aid figures in the above table are calculated in current world prices.

3. We have no concrete evidence as yet on the amount of military aid North Vietnam will receive during 1974,

4. It should be noted that combat levels in South Vietnam could rise substantially without requiring a concomitant rise in imports. Hanoi has large stocks of all major categories of military equipment and its forces could conduct major operations for an extended period before additional imports were required.

5. The amount of economic assistance to North Vietnam from other Communist states in 1974 should continue the recovery begun in 1973. Commodity aid requirements thus far appear to be remaining at very high levels and the pace of reconstruction should pick up. Much of the preliminary damage survey work has been completed and Hanoi has formulated firm goals for various sectors of its economy. Moreover, seaborne deliveries in the first quarter indicate that Haiphong harbor has been essentially restored to its pre-mining capacity. The chief limitation now on North Vietnam's ability to use reconstruction assistance will be Hanoi's deficient management capability and its shortage of skilled labor. For the remainder of 1974, foodstuff and petroleum deliveries appear likely to continue at high levels, fertilizer imports could step up, and capital goods deliveries probably will rise.

II. Communist Aid to the Khmer Communists

6. No meaningful estimates of the dollar value of aid to the Khmer Communists from North Vietnam, China, the USSR and other Communist states are available. Intercepted Khmer

C. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/30 : LOC-HAK-559-32-1-5 : names
have provided at least 900 tons, and possibly 1,300 tons or more, of ammunition and military equipment to the Khmer Communists from January through early April of 1974, but it is impossible to attach a value to these shipments. In general, it seems clear that Hanoi and the Chinese have given the Khmer Communists moderate rather than large amounts of aid in recent months, and that aid from the Soviet Union and other Communist states has been negligible.

III. US Aid to South Vietnam

7. For purposes of comparison, presented below are figures on US aid to South Vietnam (in current prices) for fiscal years 1971 through 1974. (N.B., the figures given in Section I above for Communist aid to North Vietnam are for calendar years, not fiscal years.)

US Aid
(millions of dollars)

FY 1971	
military aid	1,875
economic aid	605
TOTAL	<u>2,480</u>
 FY 1972	
military aid	2,160
economic aid	450
TOTAL	<u>2,610</u>
 FY 1973	
military aid	1,600
economic aid	525
TOTAL	<u>2,125</u>
 FY 1974	
military aid	1,125
economic aid	700
TOTAL	<u>1,825</u>